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Chapter 21 
 Conclusion: The Japanese Situation 
 
The Japanese electricity industry is currently being gradually 
deregulated in the hopes that high electricity prices can be reduced.  
At the same time the government is keen to encourage more use of 
nuclear power.  It is aiming to reuse nuclear fuel in order to close 
the nuclear fuel cycle and thereby reduce Japan’s reliance on imports 
to fuel electricity generation.1  However deregulation  in other 
parts of the world has not brought prices down, nor has it been 
conducive to investment in nuclear power. More importantly, the 
competitive pressures encouraged by deregulation do not encourage 
reliability and safety, issues which are very important to the 
Japanese people, particularly in the wake of a series of nuclear 
accidents over the past decade. 
 
HISTORY 
During the early part of the 20th Century some 700 electricity 
companies were set up in Japan. These were merged after the first 
world war into just five. During the second world war the government 
combined these five into one generating company, Nihon Hassoden KK, 
and nine distribution companies. Electricity infrastructure was badly 
damaged during the war but electricity production accelerated again 
after the war.2 
In 1951, whilst still under American occupation, Japan’s electricity 
industry was reorganised according to the US model of state-regulated 
privately-owned monopoly utilities. The country was divided into nine 
regions and in each region a single privately-owned utility was given 
a monopoly to supply electricity. (In 1972, when Okinawa was returned 
to Japan, the number of general electric utilities (GEUs) was 
increased to ten.) These GEUs are vertically integrated to include 
generation, transmission, distribution and retail supply. They are: 
• Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc., 
• Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.,  
• Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc., and 
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• Okinawa Electric Power Co., Inc. 
Tokyo Electric Power, which includes Tokyo in its region of supply, 
serves 24 million customers and is the world’s largest privately-
owned electric utility and one of Japan’s most profitable companies.3 
The generation of wholesale electricity in Japan is mainly done by 
the GEUs (75%) but it is supplemented by other electricity 
generators, referred to as wholesale electric utilites (see Figure 
21.1). The largest is the Electric Power Development Company or J-
Power, which was created in 1952 by the government to augment 
electricity supplies nation-wide at a time when the GEUs did not have 
the financial capacity to meet electricity demand. It is government 
owned and funded and builds transmission lines as well as power 
stations. It operates 67 power stations. 4  
The other major wholesale utility is Japan Atomic Power Co (JAPC) was 
created in 1957 as a joint venture of the GEUs, J-Power and industry 
interests, to promote the commercialisation of nuclear energy and 
import nuclear reactors. It owns four of the nation’s 52 power 
stations (one of which is no longer in operation).5 In addition 
thermal power plants were built ‘‘during the postwar high-growth 
period’’ as joint ventures between GEUs, steel makers and other 
industrial users. Municipal governments also operate their own 
generating plants, particularly hydroelectric plants.6 
Figure 21.1 Generating Capacity by Ownership - 1994 
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Source of data: Kibune, Hisabe. ‘Regulatory Reform and Its Effect in the Japanese 
Electric Utility Industry.' Economic Analysis Series(142). December 1995: 89-122, 
p. 93. 
In 1994 GEUs supplied 90 percent of the nation’s retail electricity 
market. Ten percent was supplied by in-house power producers. These 
are paper and pulp, chemical, steel and oil refining industries that 
generate their own electricity, often with steam that is a by-product 
of their manufacturing processes. Industrial users generated about 28 
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percent of their own electricity requirements as a way of keeping 
their costs down.7 
Specified Supply Projects supply about 3 percent of electricity 
directly to particular customers. These include municipal councils 
supplying their own departments, companies supplying electricity for 
housing or buildings  they own, and electricity supply from one 
company to another with a close relationship.8 
Until 1995 the industry was closely regulated, under the Electric 
Utility Industry Law (1964) by the Public Utilities Department of the 
Agency of Natural Resources and Energy. This regulation was supposed 
to protect the public interest; to guard national security; to 
prevent pollution;  to promote adequate development of the 
electricity sector; to ensure that the private GEU’s did not take 
advantage of their monopoly position to extort consumers, and to 
ensure safety. Although the regulations did not guarantee monopolies 
to GEUs the rules required that, before it could be licensed, a GEU 
had to show that it could supply enough capacity to meet demand in an 
area and not duplicate existing capacity. This essentially prevented 
the establishment of competing utilities within each region. 9 
GEUs, in turn, were obliged to meet demand at rates that had to be 
approved by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). 
This rate was based on cost of production plus a fair rate of return, 
as was the case for US electricity utilities. The ten companies 
cooperated to ensure that demand could be met, by exchanging  and 
supplying each other with electricity in times of need. The regional 
grids were linked by interconnections  to facilitate this. The GEUs 
also cooperated on research and development of new technologies and 
systems of procurement.10  
Japan has little in the way of indigenous resources for generating 
electricity, apart from hydroelectric power, and is therefore very 
dependent on imports. As can be seen from Figure 21.2 below, the main 
sources of electricity until the 1970s were oil, coal and 
hydroelectricity. Japan relied mainly on hydroelectric power until 
the 1950s when the use of oil expanded because at the time it was 
cheap and oil power stations could be built quickly to keep up with 
post-war growth. Oil supplied a peak of 74% of electricity in 1973 
when the first oil crisis hit but declined rapidly after that.11  
As a result of the oil crises of the 1970s, oil became an expensive 
fuel source and Japan sought to diversify its sources of electricity, 
relying more on nuclear energy and liquid natural gas (LNG). All the 
GEC’s except Okinawa Electric Power Company constructed nuclear 
facilities. Today, hydroelectric power, nuclear power, coal and 
natural gas are used for base load and mid-range load whilst oil is 
used for peak loads together with pumped storage hydroelectric 
power.12 
The 52 existing nuclear rectors operating in Japan supply one third 
of the nation’s electricity, giving it the third largest stock of 
nuclear power plants in the world, after the US and rapidly catching 
up with France.13 It is predicted nuclear power will provide 41% of 
Japan’s electricity by 2012, (see Figure 21.2). Three more reactors 
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are currently under construction and 8 in advanced stages of 
planning.14  
 
Figure 21.2 Composition Ratio of Generated Electricity by Fuel in 
Japan 
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* ProjectedSource of data: ‘Electricity Review Japan.’ The Federation of Electric 
Power  
Companies of Japan, 2004 http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/erj/erj2003-2004.pdf, p. 8. 
 
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS 
The government goal of more nuclear power is despite widespread 
public opposition to nuclear power. A series of nuclear accidents and 
cover-ups have raised public concerns about nuclear power (see Table 
21.1).  
Table 21.1 Accidents
#
 and Revelations of Mismanagement in the 
Industry  
1995-2004 
 
Year Place Owner Incident Radiation 
Exposure 
Scal
e 
* 
Status
1995 Monju fast-
breeder reactor 
prototype 
PNC Massive coolant 
leak 
  still 
closed
1997 Tokaimura fuel 
reprocessing 
PNC Fire and 
explosion 
37 workers  3 closed 
3 
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plant years 
1997 Tokaimura 
uranium fuel 
production 
plant 
PNC False alarm 
warning that 
fuel reached 
critical mass 
 ?  
1997 Fugen advanced 
thermal reactor 
PNC Radioactive 
tritium leaked 
11 workers ? temp. 
closur
e 
1997 Tokaimura 
radioactive 
waste storage 
facility 
PNC Revelations of 
low-level 
radiation leaks 
over 30 years 
 na  
1999 Tsuraga nuclear 
power plant 
JAPC Worst ever 
radioactive 
coolant leak 
 1 temp. 
closur
e 
1999 Tokaimura 
uranium 
processing 
plant 
JCO uncontrolled 
nuclear chain 
reaction 
>600 people 
2 workers 
die 
300,000 
residents 
ordered to 
stay 
indoors  
4 still 
closed
2000 Fugen advanced 
thermal reactor 
JNC Controlling rods 
in incorrect 
position 
 ? temp. 
closur
e 
2000 Joyo 
experimental 
reactor 
JNC Controlling rod 
malfunction 
 ? temp. 
closur
e 
2000 Mihama nuclear 
power plant 
KEPCO Cracked pipe, 
coolant leak 
 1 temp. 
closur
e 
2001 Hamaoka nuclear 
power plant 
CEPCO 2 unrelated 
radioactive 
leaks 
 1 temp. 
closur
e 
2002 Fukuishima 
Daiichi nuclear 
power plant 
TEPCO Core shroud 
cracks 
 1 temp. 
closur
e 
2002 Tokyo Electric 
Power Company 
TEPCO Admits it 
falsified data 
on maintenance 
checks 
 na temp. 
closur
e of 
all 
reacto
r 
2002 For a full list of incidents during 2003 see Citizens Nuclear 
Information Centre (CNIC) at 
http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit95/nit95articles/nit95significan
t.html 
2003 For a full list of incidents during 2003 see Citizens Nuclear 
Information Centre (CNIC) at 
http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit101/nit101articles/nit101siginc.
html 
2004 Tsuruga nuclear 
power plant 
JAPC Workers sprayed 
with 
contaminated 
water 
8 workers ?  
2004 Mihama nuclear 
power plant 
KEPCO Burst pipe 
containing high-
pressure steam 
5 workers 
killed 
6 in 
hospital 
0+ temp. 
closur
e 
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* International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) - from 0 to 7 (Chernobyl=7, Three Mile 
Island=5) 
# Technically only an event of 4 to 7 is an accident, the others are incidents 
PNC = government-owned Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corp or Donen 
JNC = Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute, a reformed version of PNC 
JCO = private company, wholly owned subsidiary of Sumitomo Metal Mining Co Ltd. 
CEPCO = Chubu Electric Power Co. 
TEPCO = Tokyo Electric Power Co. 
KEPCO = Kansai Electric Power Co. 
Source of data: Robert Chesal and Tim Fisher. ‘Japan's Nuclear Neglect.' Radio 
Netherlands 10 August 2004. http://www.rnw.nl/hotspots/html/jap040810.html; Jon 
Choy. ‘Deregulation Jolting Japan's Energy Sector.' JEI Report(33). 29 August 1997. 
http://www.jei.org/Archive/JEIR97/9733f.html;  
‘Chronology - Mishaps at Japan Nuclear Facilities.' World Environment News 1 
October 1999. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=3944;  
‘Japan Shuts Reactor as Precaution against Leaks.' World Environment News 15 
November 2001. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=13307;  
‘Japan Utility Says Nuke Reactor Had Crack in Pipe.' World Environment News 11 
April 2000. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=6336;  
‘Japan's Tepco Sees Better Year after Safety Scandal.' World Environment News 19 
May 2004. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=25159;  
‘Two Japan Nuclear Reactors Malfuntion but No Leak.' World Environment News 5 April 
2000. http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=6259;  
Philip White. ‘Five Killed in Mihama-3 Accident.' Nuke Info Tokyo September/October 
2004. http://cnic.jp/english/newsletter/nit102/nit102articles/nit102mihama.html;  
Miho Yoshikawa. ‘Accident a Threat to Japan Nuclear Programme.' World Environment 
News 5 October 1999. 
http://www.planetark.com/avantgo/dailynewstory.cfm?newsid=3990. 
 
There were efforts to cover up several of these incidents or lessen 
their perceived extent.  The operators of the Monju fast-breeder 
reactor edited videotapes of the leak to cover up the extent of the 
accident but this became public and did nothing to reassure the 
public. Managers at the Tokaimura fuel reprocessing plant, where 37 
people were exposed to radiation, ‘‘coerced workers into telling a 
consistent but false timeline of events’’. In addition there were 
revelations about the poor safety measures undertaken at the centre.15  
In 2002 Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) admitted that had not 
accurately reported damage to its nuclear power plants for some 
years.16 
The first incident involved hiding cracks in the reactor 
shroud. This was followed by the discovery that Tokyo 
Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) had also found cracks in the 
recirculation piping system, but had failed to report them. 
Then, there was the cover-up of the results of the leak rate 
inspection test for the containment vessel…17 
Poor inspection methods and negligence have also been blamed for some 
of these accidents such as the latest at Mihama power plant which 
involved a pipe installed in 1976 and not inspected since, despite 
warnings about it some months before the accident. Other pipes in the 
plant, including those in more critical areas, have also gone 
uninspected.18 
In 1998 the government agency Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel 
Development Corp (PNC), which was under fire for its mismanagement of 
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nuclear facilities, was replaced with the Japan Nuclear Cycle 
Development Institute (JNC). JNC is now responsible for nuclear 
research and development in the field of fast-breeder reactors, high-
level radioactive waste disposal and spent fuel reprocessing.19 
In response to growing public concern about nuclear power, the power 
companies created a Panel for Restoring Confidence made up of the 
presidents of the 10 GEUs, the JAPC, the EPDC and Japan Nuclear Fuel 
Ltd (JNFL).20 One of the more recent arguments made for nuclear power 
has been that it aids Japan to meet its Kyoto commitments, however no 
solution has yet been found for disposing of nuclear waste and the 
government’s efforts to close the nuclear cycle by recycling used 
uranium into plutonium has been less than successful.  
The Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NUMO) was formed in 2000 
to solve problems associated with disposal of high-level radioactive 
waste. Japan had been sending its waste to Europe for reprocessing  
and importing back the reprocessed waste---which is stored---and mixed 
oxide fuel (MOX), a combination of uranium and plutonium oxides. The 
government has invested billions of dollars in developing its own 
reprocessing plant. However there have been a number of scandals over 
MOX, including the discovery in 1999 that MOX fuel rods arriving in 
Japan from British Nuclear Fuels Ltd had not been properly inspected 
and the data on them had been falsified.  In addition, Japanese 
efforts to process and use plutonium and highly-enriched uranium in 
fast-breeder reactors have not been successful so far and have 
involved various accidents (see Table 21.1). This  has all added to 
public concern about Japan’s nuclear program.21  
 
THE IMPETUS FOR DEREGULATION 
Several factors have contributed to the high cost of electricity in 
Japan. The first is the high cost of nuclear power, which, as we saw 
in previous chapters, requires very high initial investments. In 
Japan, as elsewhere, nuclear accidents have caused the public to be 
wary of nuclear power plants and to oppose their location near urban 
areas. This means that they have to be sited remotely and this adds 
to the transmission costs.22 In addition, long lead times are 
lengthened even further by approval processes designed to ensure 
safety and reassure the public. 
The GEUs have also spent much more on pollution control, maintenance 
and avoiding blackouts than companies in other parts of the world, 
especially deregulated companies in the US and Britain.23 Avoiding 
blackouts is particularly expensive as Japan suffers from fluctuating 
electricity usage because of rising usage of electricity-hungry air-
conditioning and heating that peaks in mid-summer and mid-winter. 
Because peak usage is so much higher than other times, some power 
plants are only used for a short time each day at certain times of 
the year.24  
By the 1990s the rising yen mean that Japanese businesses, 
particularly manufacturing companies, were finding it hard to compete 
with foreign companies on international markets and they blamed high 
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electricity prices for contributing to this situation.25 However Hisao 
Kibune of the Department of Economics at Nagoya-Gakuin University 
notes that in in the period 1980-1993 Japanese electricity rates 
decreased by 13% whilst those in Western countries went up by 30-80% 
and when compared with the general cost of living in Japan, 
electricity rates were still falling in the early 1990s (see Figure 
21.4).26 In part this was achieved because rates reached an all time 
high following the oil crises in the 1970s, and subsequently dropped 
as oil prices went down again.27 Similarly, The Economist stated in 
1995 that ‘‘On a purchasing-power  basis, Japanese electricity prices 
compare well internationally.’’28  Nevertheless, the story that 
Japanese electricity costs are much higher than the rest of the world 
helped  to promote the case for deregulation. 
Additionally, companies found that they were able to produce 
electricity in-house at a cheaper rate that that charged by the GEUs. 
This was because fuel costs were declining due to the high yen, and 
in-house generation was not as capital-intensive as the nuclear power 
plants that the GEUs depended on. Additionally GEUs had to factor 
into their rates other costs such as transmission and distribution 
costs. Nevertheless it led Japanese business leaders to believe that 
deregulation would help lower costs. They claimed that the cost plus 
fair return did not provide incentives to reduce costs and increase 
efficiency in the way that competition would. They argued that 
competition would encourage more decentralised smaller scale 
electricity generating technologies to be developed. They also 
believed that safety regulations could be scaled back in a 
deregulated system, which would also save money.29  
Deregulation was also driven in part by what has been called the 
‘‘winds of deregulation’’ which were blowing worldwide as we have 
seen in earlier chapters of this book.30  Today Japan ‘‘considers 
deregulation a key to future economic success’’.31 This view has been 
encouraged by nations like the US that see business opportunities for 
their own corporations. For example, the US Trade Representative in 
2000, Charlene Barshefsky, stated that deregulation measures in 
Japan, achieved under the US-Japan Enhanced Initiative on 
Deregulation and Competition Policy, ‘‘will translate into 
substantial gains for U.S. firms doing business in Japan’’ because 
lucrative markets would be opened to these US firms. She claimed that 
Japanese consumers would also benefit from the lower prices, greater 
choice and increased innovation that would result. With respect to 
electricity, ‘‘US firms would be able to produce, sell, and trade 
power in Japan’s $135 billion electric power market’’ and the lower 
electricity prices that would ensue would increase economic growth 
and create thousands of new jobs.32 All promises familiar to readers 
of this book from those who advocate deregulation but promises that 
have consistently failed to materialise in the real world of 
electricity deregulation. 
 
DEREGULATION 
Deregulation in Japan has been fairly gradual. The first step towards 
deregulation, via amendments to the Electricity Utility Law in 1995,  
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was to allow the GEUs to buy electricity from outside sources 
including company in-house generators that generated more electricity 
than they needed and independent power producers (IPPs). A system of 
competitive tendering was introduced and approval conditions eased to 
facilitate this.33 It was expected this would enable the GEUs to meet 
peak demand without building new capital-intensive power plants and 
to introduce competition into the wholesale electricity market. 
Additionally the utilities could seek tenders for construction of new 
power plants from a wider range of firms, including foreign firms.34  
This was not a very satisfactory situation for newcomers to the 
market who were expected to compete with well-established GEUs by 
selling cheaper electricity to them. They could expect sales to be 
mainly at peak periods.  This did not offer much of an incentive to 
invest in new generating plant, so the new IPPs derive their power 
from surplus power from in-house generators.35  
A further amendment to the Law in 1999 meant that from 2000 any 
electricity company could compete to supply customers using more than 
2MW of electricity (see Figure 21.3). This amounted to just under one 
third of the market (30%). Electricity rates for these large 
customers were deregulated and transmission lines were opened up for 
access by third parties, although the GEUs that owned them still set 
the rates and conditions of their use. GEUs were still obliged to 
meet the energy demand of other consumers and to supply electricity 
to the contestable customers if the new companies failed or had a 
shortfall in their supply.36  
Figure 21.3 Electricity Supply System in 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adapted from: Toshihiko Furuya. Deregulation of the Electric Power Industry in 
Japan.  
Washington: Tokyo Electric Power Company. http://www.wnfm.com/ 
2001%20Annual%20Meeting%20PPT/Toshihiko%20Furuya%20Presentation.pdf  
The GEUs were also now able to supply large customers in other 
regions but there was little competition between GEUs in this way.37 
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in Europe and US can. The market was opened to electricity traders---
companies like Enron---that buy and sell electricity but don’t 
necessarily produce it.38 Nevertheless, Masanori Maruo, a utilities 
analyst with Deutsche Securities foresees that in the long term the 
number of utilities will be reduced as competition ‘weeds’ out the 
smaller electricity producers.39 
Prices did drop after the 1999 amendment came into play but this can 
be attributed to lower interest rates, since the price decrease was 
for both contestable and uncontestable consumers and there were few 
new entrants into the market and ‘‘little revealed competition 
between the incumbents’’.40 Also the price drops can be seen as part 
of a longer trend of falling prices since the 1980s (see Figure 21.4) 
and as a strategy by the GEUs to undercut potential competitors, even 
before they get established.41 
 
Figure 21.4 Average Electricity Prices for all Japanese Utilities 
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Source of data: Minoru Takahashi. ‘The Current Status of Electric Power Industry 
Deregulation in Japan and the Influence of the California Crisis.' Japan and the 
World Economy 14,  
2002, p. 343; David Pilling. ‘Tepco Pre-Empts Dereguation with Price Cut.’  
Financial Times. 1 October 2004, p. 9.  
 
By 2001 there were 41 IPPs and 9 new entrants to retail supply called 
Power Producer & Suppliers (PPSs).42 By the end of 2003 PPSs supplied 
less than 1 percent of the market (1.7 percent of the contestable 
market) and by October 2004 TEPCO, for instance, had only lost 1 
percent of its electricity sales to competitors. Some customers 
avoided PPSs because of their inability to promise reliable supply 
because they lacked a backup supply in case of emergency.43 
Because of the risks involved, newcomers to the market tend to have 
backers with deep pockets such as Diamond Power, owned by Mitsubishi, 
and Ennet, owned by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT). The only 
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PPS proposing to build a major power plant at this stage is a joint 
venture of Tokyo Gas and Royal Dutch/Shell. 44  
A bill passed in 2003 will enable electricity suppliers to  compete 
from 2005 for customers using more than 50kW of electricity such as 
small and medium businesses and apartment buildings. This means 
almost two thirds (63%) of electricity sales will be contestable. 
Complete contestability, covering all consumers, is planned for 2007. 
An independent  organization will be set up to govern transmission 
and distribution, which will remain in the ownership of the ten 
GEUs.45 Currently if two GEUs want to trade power they have to pay 
transmission fees to each of the GEUs geographically located between 
them and the price for this is set by the GEUs themselves.46 
A Power Exchange will be soon established to facilitate wholesale 
trade and price setting. This is welcomed by the large GEUs which see 
it as a way of postponing the need to invest in new power plants.47 
They may also see an opportunity to use their market power to 
influence prices in the way large power companies have done in the US 
and Britain. It is also expected that some of Japan’s large trading 
companies such as Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui and Marubeni, will 
become involved in electricity trading.48 
 
THE FORECAST 
Whether householders and small businesses will gain from the 
deregulation of retail electricity supply remains to be seen. As we 
have seen in the rest of the book, in most places where electricity 
was deregulated, retail electricity prices increased, often 
dramatically, for households and small businesses. In particular 
where a power exchange is in place and there are a number of large 
powerful companies market manipulation has taken place and there is 
no reason to suppose that Japan will be immune from this phenomenon, 
once its power exchange is up and running.  Only an excess of supply 
would prevent this and it is evident that the rate of investment in 
power plants has slowed considerably with deregulation. 
Service and reliability have also declined world wide in deregulated, 
privatised electricity systems because the service obligations of 
regulated electricity companies are replaced by short-term commercial 
goals. The emphasis on energy security and reliability, which was 
maintained at a high level by the GEUs, gave way to a concern with 
costs.49 According to the International Energy Agency deregulation of 
the energy sector in Japan ‘‘has resulted in increasing cost 
sensitivity and conflicts between the objectives of economic 
efficiency, environmental protection and energy security.’’50 Capital 
investment in the sector has fallen.51 
The supposed efficiency gains to be made by private, competitive 
companies, are usually made through short term cost savings, which 
include cutting the quality or level of service rather than offering 
the same level of service for less money. Sometimes return on 
investment has been increased by charging more for the service. Often 
cost savings have been made by  lowering rates of pay and conditions 
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for workers and making thousands of electricity workers redundant. 
Full-time permanent employment has been increasingly replaced by 
part-time and temporary work.52 In this way private enterprises may 
seem to be more efficient but the gains to shareholders are at the 
expense of workers and consumers, who suffer a decline in service 
levels.  
Another easy way to cut costs, although short-sighted, is to cut 
safety, maintenance, training and research budgets. Old equipment is 
not regularly serviced nor replaced in advance of likely failure. As 
a result, accidents and equipment-related blackouts increase as do 
blackouts related to network congestion because planning and 
responsibility for network maintenance and development is not a 
market priority.  
This is of particular concern for nuclear power stations.  In Japan 
the companies that own aging nuclear reactors are having to compete 
with newer companies that have cheaper sources of electricity and are 
so seeking to cut their own costs. One way of doing this is to reduce 
inspections or carry them out whilst the reactors are still 
operating, which is how the workers died in the Mihama plant accident 
in 2004.53 The Japanese Citizen’s Nuclear Information Center said of 
the accident: 
first lesson is that NISA and the Japanese power companies 
don't learn lessons, certainly not ones that are likely to 
cost them money. Profits are consistently given greater 
priority than safety. One would expect this tendency to be 
even more pronounced in a competitive electricity market.54 
Blackouts have also increased worldwide as a result of lower reserve 
levels of generation capacity caused by the perverse incentives of 
the market system that give greater profits to private generating 
companies during times of electricity shortages. These perverse 
incentives not only discourage investment in new generation capacity 
but encourage withholding of electricity during times of peak demand 
to send prices higher.  
Privatisation often occurs as a way of reducing public debt and the 
money raised from  electricity asset sales is often presented as if 
it is all bonus revenue for a government. However governments only 
gain in the long-term if the savings in interest repayments from 
reduced budget deficits, together with the tax payments from the new 
private companies, exceed the lost dividends, plus the additional 
costs resulting from market failures and  abuses of power  by the 
private companies. This is a dubious assumption at best.  
J-Power is to be privatised and will be another competitor in the 
electricity generation market. The share floatation for the company, 
which is 83% owned by the government and 17% owned by the GEUs, is 
expected to yield $2 billion. The sale is expected to reduce Japan’s 
public debt, although the government will also lose the profits from 
the company.55  
Private companies, freed from social obligations, are able to 
undertake profitable activities whilst the government continues to 
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pay for unprofitable aspects of electricity supply like environmental 
protection and equitable access. Previously governments were able to 
subsidise the unprofitable activities with the profitable ones. The 
inability to spread costs across a whole service means more expense 
to taxpayers and savings to industry.  
Nuclear power is expensive and requires government support. Nuclear 
waste  has to be stored or reprocessed. Reprocessed uranium is much 
more expensive than conventional uranium and the GEUs ‘‘have 
privately welcomed the public hostility to MOX fuel, promising not to 
introduce it against the wishes of local residents’’.56 Yet the 
government has invested billions of dollars (trillions of yen) in the 
project and has stockpiles of plutonium with no other use, apart from 
weapons. 
When bankruptcies are threatened governments have to be prepared to 
step in and bail out private companies so as to secure the 
electricity supply, particularly when nuclear power stations are 
involved as has been seen with British Energy in the UK where the 
government is paying billions of dollars to keep it going.57 Taxpayers 
clearly get the worst of both worlds. They no longer reap dividends 
from electricity production when it is profitable, but they still 
have to pick up the bill when it is not.  
The folly of relying on markets for fostering renewable energy has 
been recognised in many countries with ‘liberalised’ electricity 
systems and governments are again resorting to regulations to 
increase renewable energy use. In California utilities are now 
required by the government to meet 20 percent of their supply with 
renewable sources.58 Similarly in Japan, wind and solar power are 
minimal and their development depends on government support. When the 
market decides on the fuel source there is no incentive to take 
account of the environmental costs of that fuel source, nor does it 
take account of issues that have been important to the Japanese 
government such as reduced dependence on fuel imports.   
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